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Abstract
We study the price of anarchy in a class of graph coloring games (a subclass of
polymatrix common-payoff games). In those games, players are vertices of an undirected,
simple graph, and the strategy space of each player is the set of colors from 1 to k. A tight
bound on the price of anarchy of kk´1 is known (Hoefer 2007, Kun et al. 2013), for the case
that each player’s payoff is the number of her neighbors with different color than herself.
The study of more complex payoff functions was left as an open problem.
We compute payoff for a player by determining the distance of her color to the color of
each of her neighbors, applying a non-negative, real-valued, concave function f to each
of those distances, and then summing up the resulting values. This includes the payoff
functions suggested by Kun et al. (2013) for future work as special cases.
Denote f ˚ the maximum value that f attains on the possible distances 0, . . . , k´ 1.
We prove an upper bound of 2 on the price of anarchy for concave functions f that are
non-decreasing or which assume f ˚ at a distance on or below b k2c. Matching lower bounds
are given for the monotone case and for the case that f ˚ is assumed in k2 for even k. For
general concave functions, we prove an upper bound of 3. We use a simple but powerful
technique: we obtain an upper bound of λ ě 1 on the price of anarchy if we manage to
give a splitting λ1 + . . . + λk = λ such that ∑ks=1 λs ¨ f (|s´ p|) ě f ˚ for all p P {1, . . . , k}.
The discovery of working splittings can be supported by computer experiments. We show
how, once we have an idea what kind of splittings work, this technique helps in giving
simple proofs, which mainly work by case distinctions, algebraic manipulations, and real
calculus.
Graph coloring, especially in distributed and game-theoretic settings, is often used
to model spectrum sharing scenarios, such as the selection of WLAN frequencies. For
such an application, our framework would allow to express a dependence of the degree
of radio interference on the distance between two frequencies.
Keywords: graph coloring, price of anarchy, concave function, spectrum sharing
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1 Model, Notation, Basic Notions
Let G = (V, E) be an undirected, simple graph without any isolated vertices (n := |V| and
m := |E|) and k P Ně2. For v P V denote N(v) := {w P V ; {v,w} P E} the set of its neighbors
and deg(v) := |N(v)| its degree. A function c : V ÝÑ [k] is called a k-coloring or coloring, where
[k] = {1, . . . , k}. Vertices of the graph represent players, with the set of colors [k] being the
strategy space for each player. We sometimes call the set [k] the spectrum. Clearly, k-colorings
are exactly the strategy profiles of this game.1 Given a coloring c, define the payoff for player
v as
µv(c) := ∑
wPN(v)
f
(
|c(v)´ c(w)|
)
, (1)
where f is a non-negative, real-valued function defined on [0, k] (choosing this domain
instead of {0, . . . , k´ 1} is technically easier). Given such f , we denote f ˚ := maxiPD f (i) the
maximum value that f attains on the possible distances D := {0, . . . , k´ 1} between two
colors, and D˚( f ) := {i P D ; f (i) = f ˚}
the set of distances where f ˚ is attained. We call f (|c(v)´ c(w)|) the contribution of edge
{v,w}. So f ˚ is an upper bound on the contribution of any edge, and it is attained if the
two players v and w manage to put a distance between each other which is in the set
D˚( f ). We assume f ˚ ą 0, since otherwise the situation is uninteresting. By concavity, this
implies f (i) ą 0 @i P D+ := {1, . . . , k´ 1} , (2)
that is, f is positive for all the positive distances.
Let c be a k-coloring. For a player v P V and a color t P [k] we write the coloring where v
changes to color t as c[vÐ t], so
c[vÐ t](w) =
t if w = vc(w) otherwise for w P V.
A coloring c is called stable if
µv(c[vÐ t]) ď µv(c) @t P [k] @v P V . (3)
In other words, stable colorings are exactly the pure Nash equilibria of the game. The
social welfare or welfare of c is W(c) := ∑vPV µv(c). We denote the optimum welfare as
WOPT := maxcW(c), where c runs over all k-colorings; optimum colorings exist since there
are only finitely many colorings. The price of anarchy is:
PoA(G, k, f ) := max
c is stable k-coloring
WOPT
W(c)
This notion was introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [24], and the name price of an-
1The term “graph coloring game” in the literature also names a class of maker-breaker style games, which we
are not referring to here.
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archy was shortly after coined by Papadimitriou [29]. It measures the worst-case performance-
loss due to non-cooperative behavior.
It is easy to see that stable colorings always exist, by a potential function argument. This has
been observed before in the broader class of polymatrix common-payoff games [7],2 and we
repeat that simple argument here for completeness. Note that we can write social welfare as
follows: W(c) = 2 ∑
{u,w}PE
f
(
|c(u)´ c(w)|
)
(4)
If a player v makes an improvement step resulting in coloring c1 (i. e., there is t P [k] such that
c1 = c[vÐ t] and µv(c) ă µv(c1)) then
∑
{v,w}PE
f
(
|c(v)´ c(w)|
)
ă ∑
{v,w}PE
f
(
|c1(v)´ c1(w)|
)
,
that is, the part of the sum in (4) with edges incident in v strictly increases. All other terms
in the sum are maintained. Hence W(c) ă W(c1). So in particular any optimal coloring is
stable. Since existence of optimal colorings is guaranteed, we also have stable colorings. Note
however that there can be sub-optimal stable colorings, which motivates the study of the
price of anarchy.
2 Previous, Related Work and Our Contribution
Previous and Related Work
Graph coloring has been a theme in Combinatorics and Combinatorial Optimization for
many decades. A coloring c for a graph G = (V, E) is called proper or legal if c(v) ‰
c(w) for all {v,w} P E, and given v P V we call a neighbor w P N(v) properly colored if
c(v) ‰ c(w). Determining the minimal k such that a given graph admits a proper k-coloring,
i. e., the chromatic number χ(G), is NP-hard [22]. One of the classical highlights is Brooks’
theorem [6, 27], stating that for each graph G which is neither a complete graph nor a
cycle of odd length, a proper ∆-coloring can be constructed by a combinatorial algorithm in
polynomial time, where ∆ is the maximum vertex degree in G. Another important algorithmic
technique for finding proper colorings with provable worst-case performance is semi-definite
programming with randomized hyperplane rounding [21]. In addition, for more than three
decades, distributed algorithms for proper colorings have been studied, see [4] for a recent
survey. In the distributed model, each vertex is a processor and can communicate with its
neighbors, where communication is done in rounds. For example, in one round, each vertex
could communicate its color to all of its neighbors. In 2006, a study with human subjects was
conducted by Kearns et al. [23], where each subject controlled the color of one vertex, to be
selected from a set of χ(G) colors, and each subject could see the colors of her neighbors.
2In [7], the term “coordination” is used instead of “common-payoff”.
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The goal was to construct a proper coloring. The study used graphs with n = 38 vertices and
focused on certain classes of graphs, like cycles, small world graphs, and random graphs from
the preferential attachment model. It is reported how the time required to reach a proper
coloring is influenced by the structure of the graph.
A game-theoretic view on proper colorings was given in 2008 by Panagopoulou and Spi-
rakis [28]. In their model, payoff for a player v is 0 whenever there exists a non-properly
colored neighbor of v, otherwise payoff is the total number of players with color c(v) in
the graph. The idea is to incentivize players to create a proper coloring with few different
colors. Indeed, two of the main results in [28] are that Nash equilibria can be constructed
by improvement steps in polynomial time, and that they are proper colorings using a total
number of different colors that is upper-bounded by several known upper bounds on χ(G).
So [28] yields a constructive proof for all of those bounds. For the same model, improved
bounds and an extension to coalitions were later given by Escoffier et al. [12]; and Chatzi-
giannakis et al. [9] gave algorithmic improvements including experimental studies. Also in
2008, Chaudhuri et al. [10] considered the simpler payoff function that is 1 for player v if all
of v’s neighbors are properly colored and 0 otherwise. They showed that if the total number
of available colors is ∆+ 1 and if players do improvement steps in a randomized manner,
then an equilibrium (which also is a proper coloring) is reached in O(log(n)) steps with high
probability.
A generalization of proper colorings are distance-constrained labelings, which are connected
to the frequency assignment problem, where colors correspond to frequencies [20]. Given
integers p1, . . . , pl , a coloring c is called an L(p1, . . . , pl)-labeling if for all i P [l] and all
v,w P V we have |c(v)´ c(w)| ě pi whenever distG(v,w) = i, where distG(v,w) is the graph-
theoretical distance between v and w, i. e., the length of a shortest v-w path in G. The notion
of L(1)-labeling coincides with that of proper coloring. The case of L(p, q)-labelings, that
is, where l = 2, has received special attention, in particular in connection with frequency
assignment, see, e. g., [8, 18, 37]. As a variation of this, not the distance |c(v)´ c(w)| between
colors is considered, but instead it is required that
min
{
|c(v)´ c(w)|, k´ |c(v)´ c(w)|
}
ě pi ,
whenever distG(v,w) = i, as considered in [35]. Another variation are T-colorings [16, 32]:
given a set of integers T, a T-coloring is one where |c(v)´ c(w)| R T whenever {v,w} P E.
This problem also arises in frequency assignment where T is the set of forbidden separations
between neighboring senders, which are known to cause interference.
In our model, we allow colorings being evaluated by the payoff function and not only ask
whether they have a certain property (e. g., being proper, a T-coloring, etc.) or not. For
example, using
f : [0, k] ÝÑ Rě0, x ÞÑ
0 if x = 01 otherwise (5)
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as the function f , payoff for each player v is the number of her properly colored neighbors.
We call this basic payoff. Note that this is a concave function. With this payoff, the game is also
known as a max-k-cut game (in the unweighted version), since we partition the vertices in k
clusters and payoff for v is the total number of cut edges incident to v, i. e., edges incident
to v and running between clusters. These games were studied by Hoefer [19] in 2007, and a
tight bound of kk´1 on the price of anarchy was proved, where tightness is already attained
on bipartite graphs. The upper bound works by a mean-value argument: for each coloring
and for each player v, there is a color t that occurs on at most deg(v)k neighbors of v. In a
stable coloring, v chooses this t, or even better if possible, hence obtaining a payoff of at least
k´1
k deg(v). Since optimum welfare is upper-bounded by 2m, the theorem follows from this
(using the handshaking lemma for the sum of degrees). In Section A we provide indication
that already for f (x) = x, a straightforward generalization of this technique cannot yield a
constant upper bound.
A weighted version of max-k-cut games is obtained by assigning a weight to each edge
and defining payoff for v as the sum of the weights of the incident cut edges. This version
under the aspect of coalitions among players was studied by Gourvès and Monnot [15]
in 2009.
In 2013, Kun, Powers, and Reyzin [25] considered complexity issues for basic payoff, i. e.,
payoff as per (5), combined with variations of the game. It is clear that since welfare for basic
payoff can only change in integer steps and can never be more than 2m, we will reach a stable
coloring after at most O(m) improvement steps (m is the number of edges in the graph). On
the other hand, Kun et al. show that for basic payoff, it is NP-hard to decide whether a graph
admits a strictly stable coloring, where the latter notion is defined by replacing ď for ă in (3).
They also show that for basic payoff, it is NP-hard to decide whether a directed graph has a
stable coloring, where for directed graphs, payoff is defined by having the sum in (1) only
range over the out-neighbors of v.
Recently, in 2014, Apt et al. [3] used the function
f : [0, k] ÝÑ Rě0, x ÞÑ
1 if x = 00 otherwise , (6)
which counts the neighbors of the same color, together with the extension that each player
has a set of colors to choose from (whereas we in our model always allow all colors for all
players). They study this game under different aspects, including coalitions, price of anarchy,
and complexity. As for the price of anarchy without coalitions, it is easy to see that it can be
unbounded. The lower-bound construction depends on the fact that we can forbid certain
colors for certain players: for example, for each player v let there be a distinct “private” color
sv, and in addition there is a “common” color t. Player v can choose her color from the set
{sv, t}. The social optimum, namely 2m, is obtained when each player chooses t, whereas a
worst case stable coloring, with welfare 0, is obtained when each player v chooses sv. Without
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the ability to restrict players to certain colors, i. e., if we use our framework for the function f
in (6), a tight bound on the price of anarchy of k is easy to see (Section B).
The graph coloring games studied in our work belong to the class of polymatrix games [7, 36].
In such a game, we have a graph G = (V, E), for each player a set of strategies, and for
each edge {v,w} P E a two-player matrix game Γ{v,w}. Each player v chooses one strategy
and has to play this same strategy in all the games {Γ{v,w}}wPN(v) corresponding to incident
edges. Payoff for v is the sum of the payoffs over all those two-player games. A special case
is that of polymatrix common-payoff games, which means that each Γ{v,w} is a common-payoff
game, i. e., it always yields the same payoff for v as for w.3 Thus our graph coloring games
belong to this class, since each edge {v,w} contributes the same value f (|c(v)´ c(w)|) to
the payoffs of v and of w. Very recently, in 2015, Rahn and Schäfer [31] studied polymatrix
common-payoff games with coalitions. They consider (α, l)-equilibria, that are α-approximate
equilibria under coalitions of size l. For the corresponding price of anarchy, they give a lower
bound of 2α(n´ 1)/(l ´ 1) + 1´ 2α and an upper bound of 2α(n´ 1)/(l ´ 1). Note that in
our work, we have l = 1 since we do not consider coalitions, and for this case their bounds
are 8. This follows already from the example given in [3], which is based on restricting
certain players to certain colors (the “private” and “public” colors) and is explained in the
previous paragraph.
Our Direction
In 2013, Kun et al. [25] named as open problems the study of the price of anarchy for payoff as
per (1) and induced by f being the identity, i. e., the contribution of edge {v,w} is the distance
|c(v)´ c(w)|. We call this distance payoff. A variation, which Kun et al. also refer to, is the
notion studied by van den Heuvel et al. [35] in the context of frequency assignment, namely
the contribution of {v,w} is min {|c(v)´ c(w)|, k´ |c(v)´ c(w)|}, which in our notation
means f (x) = min {x, k´ x}. We call this cyclic payoff. It rewards players for keeping a
“medium” distance from others. This has an additional interpretation in connection with an
example often given in the context of proper colorings, namely where colors correspond to
skills and people inside of an organization try to develop skills that are complementary to
nearby colleagues (see, e. g., [10, 23]). Cyclic payoff refines that idea: subjects are incentivized
to develop different but still related (that is, not too far away) skills. Distance and cyclic payoff
both result from concave functions f , so they are both special cases of the payoff functions
studied in our work.
Spectrum sharing and frequency (or channel) assignment problems, that is, when a multitude
of participants compete for using the same or similar frequencies, has received much attention
lately, see, e. g., [11, 13, 17, 30]. Many works in that field use some form of graph coloring
3Such are called “coordination games” sometimes, but the use of this term is not consistent in the literature.
We stick to the terminology from [26, Sec. 1.3.2], which is “common-payoff game”.
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(colors corresponding to frequencies) in a distributed or game-theoretic setting. It is common
in the frequency assignment literature to consider not only feasible versus infeasible colorings
but instead to quantify the “degree of interference”. To this end, the spectral distance
|c(v)´ c(w)| between players v and w is often used as a measure or as a substantial ingredient
to a measure. In addition to the references we give above for distance-constrained labeling and
for T-coloring, this is documented for example in [14, Sec. 2], [2, Sec. 2.1], [34, Sec. II.B], [1,
Sec. 3], and [5, Sec. 11.6]. So our game can be used to model the case where each participant
of a wireless network, e. g., a mobile telephone network or wireless sensor network, chooses
her frequency non-cooperatively and with respect to a measure of interference expressed by a
concave function applied to spectral distances (where higher values of that function mean
less interference).
A first game-theoretic study of distance and cyclic payoff in our framework was conducted by
Schink [33] in 2014. He observed that a stable k-coloring for distance payoff can be constructed
from a stable 2-coloring for basic payoff by replacing color 2 with k. A similar approach
works for cyclic payoff if k is even, replacing color 2 with k2 + 1. Since a stable coloring for
basic payoff can be constructed in O(m) improvement steps, this gives a runtime guarantee
independent of k. Since welfare can reach up to Ω(mk) for distance and cyclic payoff, such a
k-independent guarantee is not easily possible by a direct argument using improvement steps.
Interestingly, for cyclic payoff and odd k, we have no k-independent runtime guarantee for the
construction of stable colorings at this time. For price of anarchy, Schink proved an upper
bound of ∆(G), the maximum vertex degree in G, for cyclic payoff. Apart from that, we are
not aware of any bounds on the price of anarchy for graph coloring games with concave
payoff, not even conjectures. The work by Rahn and Schäfer [31], for general polymatrix
common-payoff games, can be considered orthogonal to ours since they do not consider
the effects of restricting the two-player games Γ{v,w} to certain classes, whereas we restrict
to such games arising from applying a concave function to the color distance |c(v)´ c(w)|,
resulting in small constant bounds on the price of anarchy. Moreover, [31] allows restricting
players to certain sets of colors (making finite bounds on the price of anarchy impossible
without coalitions), whereas in our model, each player has the same set of colors to choose
from.
Our Contribution and Techniques
We prove constant upper bounds on the price of anarchy for several classes of concave
functions f . We prove a bound of 2 for all concave functions f which assume f ˚ at a distance
on or below b k2c, that is, for which D˚( f )X {0, . . . , b k2c} ‰ H. This includes cyclic payoff.
We show that for this class of functions, this bound is the best possible, since for cyclic
payoff with even k, the price of anarchy is exactly 2. For non-decreasing concave functions,
we also show an upper bound of 2. This includes distance payoff. Again, we show that for
this class of functions, this bound is the best possible. Finally, for all remaining concave
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functions, which have D˚( f )X {b k2c+ 1, . . . , k´ 2} ‰ H, we prove an upper bound of 3. The
upper bounds are proved in Section 5 and Section 7, and the lower bounds are given in
Section 6.
It may be surprising at first that the situation is not symmetric: functions with their maximum
left of the middle of the spectrum behave differently from functions with their maximum
right of the middle. But in fact this is to be expected since for example, a player can always
force all the distances to her neighbors to be on or below b k2c by choosing her own color as
b k2c+ 1, but it is not always possible to force all distances beyond 1. So there is an asymmetry
between short and long distances.
All our proofs work by local arguments. That is, if we are to prove an upper bound of λ ě 1 on
the price of anarchy, we show the following: for each player v, given the colors {c(w)}wPN(v)
of her neighbors, there is a color t P [k] such that
∑
wPN(v)
f
(
|c(w)´ t|
)
ě deg(v) ¨ f
˚
λ
.
Clearly, in a stable coloring, each player chooses such a color t, or better. Hence W(c) ě 2mf˚λ
for a stable c. Since WOPT ď 2mf ˚, the bound λ follows.
In the next section, we provide a framework for the type of local arguments described in the
above paragraph. To this end, we introduce the local parameter λ( f , k) of a function f and
show PoA(G, f , k) ď λ( f , k). In Section 4, we show how to obtain an upper bound of 4 on
the local parameter, and thus on the price of anarchy, for any concave function f by a simple
technique. In Section 5, a more elaborate technique is introduced. It says that if we can find a
representation of a number λ ě 1 as a sum λ1 + . . . + λk = λ with ∑ks=1 λs ¨ f (|s´ p|) ě f ˚
for all p P [k], then we have λ( f , k) ď λ, and thus a bound of λ on the price of anarchy. Using
this splitting technique, we prove our main results in Section 5 and Section 7. For example, the
upper bound of 2 for cyclic payoff can be proven using the splitting defined by λ1 := 1 and
λb k2 c+1 := 1 and λs := 0 for all remaining indices s P [k]z{1, b
k
2c+ 1}.
Appropriate splittings up to a certain granularity for moderate values of k and given function
f can be found by computer, doing a simple enumeration. We fix δ = (δ1, . . . , δr) such that
λ = ∑ri=1 δi, for example δ = (1, 1,
1
4 ,
1
4 ) for λ = 2.5. For each v = (v1, . . . , vr) P [k]r define a
splitting λ(v) by λs(v) := ∑ iP[r]
vi=s
δi for each s P [k]. Then we let the computer enumerate all
v P [k]r and output those corresponding splittings λ(v) that satisfy the necessary conditions.
Although this is for a concrete k and not general, it can give valuable hints on how to do a
general proof. We used this, with δ = (1, 1) and δ = (1, 1, 1), to obtain essential ideas for the
proofs in Section 7.
8
Ongoing Work and Open Problems
• Computer experiments suggest that the splitting technique should be powerful enough to
prove an upper bound of 2.5 for general concave functions, instead of the 3 that we get. A
possible splitting appears to have the form 1+ 1+ 14 +
1
4 , but deciding on the actual indices,
i. e., which s1, . . . , s4 P [k] to choose in order to define λs1 := 1 and λs2 := 1 and λs3 := 14
and λs4 :=
1
4 , is more complicated. We verified by experiment that appropriate indices can
be found at least for all k ď 100.
• Computer experiments suggest that for functions assuming their maximum left of the
middle of the spectrum, better bounds than 2 on the local parameter should possible,
depending on the exact location of the maximum. However, the evidential basis for this is
thin at this time, since enumerative computer experiments are hindered by the exponential
search space (cf. the definition in (7) below).
• Apart from the splitting technique, are there further theoretical methods to compute or
to approximate the local parameter? Are there faster practical methods for this task than
simple enumeration?
• For which functions f and which ranges for parameter k can we find graphs G such
that PoA(G, f , k) = λ( f , k)? In this work in Section 6, we construct such graphs for
f (x) = min {x, k´ x} and even k (cyclic payoff) and for f of the form f (x) = ax+ b.
• Computational issues for finding stable colorings should be addressed, in particular the
construction of stable colorings for cyclic payoff and odd k in a number of steps being
independent of k.
3 The Local Parameter
For a function f : [0, k] ÝÑ Rě0 we define the local parameter of f as
λ( f , k) := max
νPN maxc1,...,cνP[k]
ν f ˚
maxtP[k] ∑νi=1 f (|ci ´ t|)
. (7)
By (2), the denominator is never zero. Clearly, the denominator is never greater than ν f ˚, so
λ( f , k) ě 1. The intuition is that we capture the best way a player can react to a given set of
colors c1, . . . , cν (which will be the colors of her neighbors when applying this to the graph
coloring game) relative to the maximum conceivable payoff ν f ˚.
8 Remark. We have PoA(G, k, f ) ď λ( f , k).
Proof. Let c be stable and v P V. By definition of the local parameter, we have
λ( f , k) ě deg(v) ¨ f
˚
maxtP[k] ∑wPN(v) f (|c(v)´ t|) hence, maxtP[k] ∑wPN(v)
f (|c(v)´ t|) ě deg(v) ¨ f
˚
λ( f , k)
.
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That is, there is a color t which v can choose to obtain payoff at least that much. Since c is
stable, player v chooses such a color, or better, so µv(c) ě deg(v)¨ f˚λ( f ,k) . Choosing c as a worst-case
stable coloring, and using the trivial upper bound WOPT ď 2mf ˚ and the handshaking lemma,
we obtain:
PoA(G, k, f ) =
WOPT
W(c)
ď 2mf
˚
∑vPV µv(c)
ď 2mf
˚
f˚
λ( f ,k) ∑vPV deg(v)
= λ( f , k)
The local parameter has the following simple properties.
9 Remark.
• The local parameter is invariant against scaling, that is, λ( f , k) = λ(γ f , k) for all γ P Rą0.
• The local parameter is monotone in the following way. Let f , g : [0, k] ÝÑ Rě0 such that
f (i) ě g(i) for all i P D, and f ˚ = g˚. Then λ( f , k) ď λ(g, k).
Proof. Follows directly from the definition in (7).
4 A First Upper Bound
As a start, we provide a lose bound of 4 on the local parameter by a simple argument. This
bound is later improved to 2 and 3, depending on where f assumes its maximum.
10 Theorem. Let f be concave. Then λ( f , k) ď 4.
Proof. Let ν P N and c1, . . . , cν P [k] and define the function φ(t) := ∑νi=1 f (|ci ´ t|). We
are done if we can prove that there is t P [k] with φ(t) ě ν f˚4 . Let k˚ P D˚( f ), i. e., k˚ P
{0, . . . , k´ 1} with f (k˚) = f ˚. By concavity, f assumes a value of at least f˚2 between k˚
and the half-way point to 0 as well as to the half-way point to k, i. e., for all x P H :=
[ k
˚
2 , k
˚ + k´k˚2 ] = [
k˚
2 ,
k+k˚
2 ] we have f (x) ě f
˚
2 . One of the following two cases is given:
ci ď b k2c for at least ν2 distinct i P [ν], or ci ě b k2c+ 1 for at least ν2 distinct i P [ν].
Assume the first case. We choose t := d k+k˚2 e ď d 2k2 e = k. Let i P [ν] be an index with ci ď b k2c
(of which we have at least ν2 ones in this case). Then
|ci ´ t| = t´ ci ď t´ 1 = d k+k˚2 e´ 1 ď k+k
˚
2 ,
and t´ ci ě d k+k˚2 e´ b k2c ě k+k
˚
2 ´ k2 = k
˚
2 .
Hence |ci ´ t| P H, which means that f (|ci ´ t|) ě f
˚
2 . Since we have at least
ν
2 of those indices,
it follows φ(t) ě ν2 f
˚
2 =
ν f˚
4 .
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The other case can be treated likewise; define t := d k´k˚2 e. Let i P [ν] be an index with
ci ě b k2c+ 1. Then
|ci ´ t| = ci ´ t ď k´ d k´k˚2 e ď k´ k´k
˚
2 =
k+k˚
2 ,
and ci ´ t ě b k2c+ 1´ d k´k
˚
2 e ě k2 ´ 12 + 1´ ( k´k
˚
2 +
1
2) =
k˚
2 .
So also in the case, |ci ´ t| P H.
5 The Splitting Technique
We give a simple but powerful technique to prove upper bounds on the local parameter of
a given function. Given a number λ P Rě1, we call a family of numbers λ1, . . . ,λk P Rě0 a
splitting of λ, provided that λ = ∑ks=1 λs.
11 Lemma. Let λ ě 1 and λ1, . . . ,λk P Rě0 be a splitting of λ. Let f : [0, k] ÝÑ Rě0. Assume
that the following condition is given:
@p P [k] :
k
∑
s=1
λs ¨ f (|s´ p|) ě f ˚ (*)
Then λ( f , k) ď λ.
Proof. Let ν P N and c1, . . . , cν P [k]. We prove that λ ¨maxtP[k] ∑νi=1 f (|ci ´ t|) ě ν f ˚. For each
p P [k] denote νp := |{i P [ν] ; ci = p}|, that is, how many times the number p occurs in the
family c1, . . . , cν. We have:
λ ¨max
tP[k]
ν
∑
i=1
f (|ci ´ t|) =
k
∑
s=1
λs ¨max
tP[k]
ν
∑
i=1
f (|ci ´ t|) def. of splitting
ě
k
∑
s=1
λs ¨
ν
∑
i=1
f (|ci ´ s|) maximum
=
k
∑
s=1
λs ¨
k
∑
p=1
νp ¨ f (|p´ s|) subsume same values
=
k
∑
p=1
νp ¨
k
∑
s=1
λs ¨ f (|p´ s|) exchange summation
ě
k
∑
p=1
νp f ˚ by (*)
= ν f ˚
We demonstrate the use of the splitting technique by a couple of simple proofs.
11
12 Proposition. Let a P Rą0 and b P Rě0 and f (x) = ax + b. Then λ( f , k) ď ρ(a, b, k) :=
2 a(k´1)+ba(k´1)+2b ď 2.
Proof. All we have to do is check (*) for this function f and an appropriate splitting of
λ = ρ(a, b, k). We have f ˚ = a (k´ 1) + b. Define λ1 := λk := ρ(a,b,k)2 = f
˚
a (k´1)+2b and λs := 0
for all other s, that is, all s P [k]z{1, k}. We have to check
@p P [k] : f
˚
a (k´ 1) + 2b ¨
(
f (p´ 1) + f (k´ p)
)
ě f ˚ ,
that is, @p P [k] : f (p´ 1) + f (k´ p) ě a (k´ 1) + 2b .
The latter is clearly true due to the definition of f .
13 Corollary. Let f be concave, non-constant, and non-decreasing. Then λ( f , k) ď ρ(a, b, k) ď
2, where a := f (k´1)´ f (0)k´1 and b := f (0). (Since f is non-constant, a ą 0. The constant case is
trivial and needs no attention.)
Proof. Define the function g : [0, k] ÝÑ Rě0, x ÞÑ ax + b. By concavity of f , we have
g(x) ď f (x) for all x P [0, k´ 1]. By monotonicity of f , we have f ˚ = g˚. The corollary follows
from Remark 9.
We also treat the case of a decreasing affine and then a non-increasing concave function. Here
it makes sense to allow f to assume negative values in (k´ 1, k].
14 Proposition. Let a P Rą0 and b P Rě0 and f (x) = b´ ax, such that f (k´ 1) ě 0. Then
λ( f , k) ď ρ1(a, b, k) := 2b2b´a(k´1) , which is 2 for the case of f (k´ 1) = 0.
Proof. We have f ˚ = b. Define λ1 := λk :=
ρ1(a,b,k)
2 =
f˚
2b´a(k´1) and λs := 0 for all other s. Now
(*) follows from a simple calculation as in the proof of Proposition 12.
15 Corollary. Let f be concave, non-constant, and non-increasing. Then λ( f , k) ď ρ1(a, b, k),
where a := f (0)´ f (k´1)k´1 and b := f (0).
Proof. Like Corollary 13.
16 Proposition. Let f (x) = min {x, k´ x}, that is, cyclic payoff. Then the price of anarchy is
upper-bounded by 2.
Proof. All we have to do is check (*) for this function f and an appropriate splitting of λ = 2.
For i P N denote ki := b k2c+ i. Then f ˚ = k0 and f (x) = x if x ď k0 and f (x) = k´ x if x ě k1.
Define λ1 := 1 and λk1 := 1 and λs := 0 for all other s. Condition (*) reduces to:
@p P [k] : f (p´ 1) + f (|k1 ´ p|) ě k0 (17)
To show (17), let p P [k]. If 1 ď p ď k1, then p´ 1 ď k0 and k1 ´ p ď k0, so we have:
f (p´ 1) + f (|k1 ´ p|) = f (p´ 1) + f (k1 ´ p) = p´ 1+ k1 ´ p = k0
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If k2 ď p ď k, then p´ 1 ě k2 ´ 1 = k1 and p´ k1 ď k´ k1 = d k2e´ 1 ď k0, so we have:
f (p´ 1) + f (|k1 ´ p|) = f (p´ 1) + f (p´ k1) = k´ (p´ 1) + p´ k1 = k´ k0 ě k0
This concludes the proof.
6 Lower Bounds
18 Proposition. The bound of ρ(a, b, k) implied by Proposition 12 on the price of anarchy for
affine functions f is the best possible, and the worst case is assumed already on bipartite
graphs.
Proof. We give an instance of the graph coloring game with function f (x) = ax+ b that has
price of anarchy ρ(a, b, k). Consider the complete bipartite graph K2,2 and denote {u1, u2}
the vertices of one partition and {w1,w2} those of the other (so edges are all {ui,wj} with
i, j P {1, 2}). Define coloring c by:
c(u1) := 1 c(u2) := k c(w1) := b k+12 c c(w2) := d k+12 e
It is easy to see that c is stable: players w1 and w2 have payoff a (k´ 1) + 2b each, no matter
which color they choose. Players u1 and u2 also have payoff a (k´ 1) + 2b each, but only for
colors 1 and k; for all other colors they get less. An optimal coloring is obtained by c(ui) := 1
and c(wi) := k for i P {1, 2}, with each edge giving contribution a (k´ 1) + b. We have, using
the number m = 4 of edges,
WOPT
W(c)
=
2 ¨ 4 ¨ (a (k´ 1) + b)
4 ¨ (a (k´ 1) + 2b) = ρ(a, b, k) .
19 Proposition. The bound of ρ1(a, b, k) implied by Proposition 14 on the price of anarchy for
affine decreasing functions f is the best possible, and the worst case is assumed already on
bipartite graphs.
Proof. We use the same graph as in the proof of Proposition 18. However, we define coloring
c by: c(u1) := 1 c(u2) := k c(w1) := 1 c(w2) := k
It is easy to see that this is stable with W(c) = 4 (2b´ a(k´ 1)). Since the optimum is 8b,
when all players choose the same color, a price of anarchy of 2b2b´a(k´1) = ρ
1(a, b, k) follows.
20 Proposition. The bound of 2 implied by Proposition 16 on the price of anarchy for cyclic
payoff is the best possible for even k, and the worst case is assumed already on a cycle of even
length. For odd k, we have a lower bound of 32 (1´ 1k ).
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Proof. Again for each i P N0 denote ki := b k2c+ i. First let k be even. Consider a cycle of length
4n for some n P Ně1 and color like so:
1, 1, k1, k1, 1, 1, k1, k1, . . .
Then half of the edges have contribution 0, namely between players of the same color, and the
other half has contribution k0 each, so the welfare is nk0. We prove that this coloring is stable.
Let v be a player with c(v) = 1. Her payoff is k0. If she changes to a color 2 ď t ď k1, her new
payoff will be (t´ 1) + (k1 ´ t) = k1 ´ 1 = k0, so no improvement. If she changes to a color
k1 + 1 ď t ď k, her new payoff will be (t´ k1) + k´ (t´ 1) = k´ k1 + 1 = k0 ´ 1+ 1 = k0, so
also no improvement. The case c(v) = k1 is treated likewise. An optimal coloring uses 1 and
k1 alternately and yields welfare 2nk0. This proves the claim.4
For odd k, we take a cycle of length 6n for some n P Ně1 and color like so: 1, k1, k2, 1, k1, k2, . . ..
The pattern 1, k1, k2 can be repeated an integral number of times since the number of vertices
is a multiple of 3. This yields welfare 2n (k0 + 1+ k0) = 4nk0 + 2n, so in comparison with the
optimum (still attained by using 1 and k1 alternately, since number of vertices is even) we
have 6nk0
4nk0 + 2n
=
3
2
(
1´ 1
2k0 + 1
)
=
3
2
(
1´ 1
k
)
.
We prove that this coloring is stable. Let v be a player with c(v) = 1. Her payoff is 2k0. If she
changes to color t with 2 ď t ď k1, her new payoff will be (k1 ´ t) + (k2 ´ t) = 2k0 + 3´ 2t ď
2k0 ´ 1, so no improvement. If she changes to color t with k2 ď t ď k = 2k0 + 1, her new
payoff will be (t´ k1) + (t´ k2) = 2t´ 2k0 ´ 3 ď 2(2k0 + 1)´ 2k0 ´ 3 = 2k0 ´ 1, so also no
improvement.
Now let c(v) = k1. Her payoff is k0 + 1 = k1. If she changes to color t with 2 ď t ď k1´ 1 = k0,
her new payoff will be (t´ 1) + (k2´ t) = k2´ 1 = k1, so it is no improvement. If she changes
color to 1, then her new payoff will be k´ (k2 ´ 1) = k´ k1 = k´ k0 ´ 1 = k1 ´ 1 = k0, so no
improvement; note that k´ k0 = k1. If she changes to color t with k1 + 1 ď t ď k, her new
payoff will be k´ (t´ 1) + (t´ k2) = k+ 1´ k0 ´ 2 = k1 ´ 1, so also no improvement. The
case c(v) = k2 can be treated likewise and is omitted here.
7 General Concave f
We define a family of “prototype” concave functions. For each ` P N with 1 ď ` ă k ´ 1
define:
f` : [0, k] ÝÑ Rě0, x ÞÑ
 x` if x ď `k´x
k´` if x ě `
(21)
4The above construction is not stable for odd k, since then for example a player with color k1 could change
to k2: this would not change the contribution of the edge to the 1-colored neighbor (it remains k0) but would
increase distance from 0 to 1 regarding the k1-colored neighbor, hence increasing payoff by 1.
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So this function rises in a linear fashion from 0 until it reaches value 1 in `, and then it drops
in a linear fashion until it reaches value 0 in k. Clearly, f ˚` = 1. For even k and ` = k2 , this
function is that for cyclic payoff. The following remark shows how to transfer bounds on
the local parameter on members of this familiy to general concave functions. Note that the
cases 0 P D˚( f ) and k´ 1 P D˚( f ) describe monotone functions f and have been covered in
Section 5 already (monotone on [0, k´ 1], which is sufficient).
22 Remark. Let f : [0, k] ÝÑ Rě0 be concave. Then λ( f , k) ď λ( f`, k) for all ` P D˚( f )z{0, k´ 1}.
Proof. Let ` P D˚( f )z{0, k´ 1}. Define g := ff˚ , then g˚ = 1 and g(`) = 1 = f`(`), so
g˚ = f ˚`. By concavity,5 f`(x) ď g(x) for all x P [0, k]. Applying Remark 9 two times yields:
λ( f , k) = λ( ff˚ ) = λ(g, k) ď λ( f , k).
23 Theorem. For ` ă d k2e we have λ( f`, k) ď 2.
Proof. For each i P N0 denote ki := b k2c+ i and also k1 := d k2e. Define the following splitting:
λk1 := 1 and λk1´` := 1 and λs := 0 for all other s. Let p P [k]. We have to show:
φ(p) := f (|k1 ´ p|) + f (|k1 ´ `´ p|) ě 1
The following observations help to make the necessary case distinction:
|k1 ´ p| ď ` ðñ k1 ´ ` ď p ď k1 + `
|k1 ´ `´ p| ď ` ðñ k1 ´ 2` ď p ď k1
Case 1 ď p ă k1 ´ 2`:
φ(p) =
k´ (k1 ´ p) + k´ (k1 ´ `´ p)
k´ ` =
2(k´ k1 + p) + `
k´ ` ě
2(k0 + 1) + `
k´ ` ě
k+ `
k´ ` ą 1
Case k1 ´ 2` ď p ă k1 ´ `:
φ(p) =
k´ (k1 ´ p)
k´ ` +
k1 ´ `´ p
`
ě k´ (k
1 ´ p) + k1 ´ `´ p
k´ ` = 1
Case k1 ´ ` ď p ď k1:
φ(p) =
k1 ´ p+ p´ k1 + `
`
= 1
Case k1 ă p ď k1 + `:
φ(p) =
p´ k1
`
+
k´ (p´ k1 + `)
k´ ` ě
p´ k1 + k´ (p´ k1 + `)
k´ ` = 1
Case k1 + ` ă p ď k:
φ(p) =
k´ (p´ k1) + k´ (p´ k1 + `)
k´ ` =
2(k+ k1 ´ p)´ `
k´ ` ě
2k1 ´ `
k´ ` ě
k´ `
k´ ` = 1
5Due to the particular shape of f`, in order for this concavity argument to work, it is important that f is
concave on [0, k] and not only on [0, k´ 1].
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In the following, we will treat the case of ` ą b k2c. The only case thus not covered here is
when k is even and ` = k2 , but this has been covered in Section 5 since it coincides with cyclic
payoff. Hence so far we have λ( f`, k) ď 2 for all ` ď b k2c. For the remaining cases, we start
with a technical preparation.
24 Proposition. Let b k2c ă ` ď k´ 1, in particular k ě 3. Then there is an integer i P N with
2 ď i ď ` such that: (k´ `) (2`´ k)
`
ď i ď ` (k´ `)
2`´ k + 1 (25)
Proof. For ρ P ( 12 , 1] define:
h1(ρ) :=
(1´ ρ) k (2ρk´ k)
ρk
=
(1´ ρ) (2ρ´ 1)
ρ
k = (3´ 2ρ´ 1ρ ) k
and:
h2(ρ) :=
ρk (1´ ρ) k
2ρk´ k + 1 =
ρ´ ρ2
2ρ´ 1 k+ 1 =
1´ ρ
2´ 1ρ
k+ 1
That is, conceptually, we replace ` by ρk. The value of ρ corresponding to the maximum `,
namely k´ 1, is 1´ 1k .
It is easy to see that if there is an integer i with (25), then this i can be chosen so that 2 ď i ď `:
we have h1(ρ) ď ρk for all ρ (since the function ρ ÞÑ 3´ 3ρ´ 1ρ is concave with a negative
value at its maximum ρ = 1√
3
); and moreover h2(ρ) ě 2 for all ρ ď 1´ 1k since h2(1´ 1k ) ě 2
and h2 is non-increasing.
Finall we note that h(ρ) := h2(ρ)´ h1(ρ)´ 1 ě 0 for all ρ; in other words, we show that there
is space for at least one integer between the two bounds. This follows from the three facts:
h(1) = 0 and h is non-increasing (seen by looking at its first derivative) and h(ρ) Ñ 8 as
ρÑ 12 .
26 Theorem. For ` ą b k2c we have λ( f`, k) ď 3.
Proof. We choose 2 ď i ď ` as per Proposition 24. Then define λ1 := 1 and λi := 1 and
λ`+1 := 1. Let p P [k]. We have to show:
φ(p) := f (p´ 1) + f (|p´ i|) + f (|p´ (`+ 1)|) ě 1
Case 1 ď p ď i:
φ(p) =
(p´ 1) + (i´ p) + (`+ 1´ p)
`
=
i+ `´ p
`
ě i+ `´ i
`
= 1
Case i+ 1 ď p ď `+ 1:
φ(p) =
(p´ 1) + (p´ i) + (`+ 1´ p)
`
=
p´ i+ `
`
ě (i+ 1)´ i+ `
`
ą 1
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Case `+ 2 ď p ď `+ i: We have
φ(p) =
k´ (p´ 1)
k´ ` +
p´ i
`
+
p´ (`+ 1)
`
=
k´ p+ 1
k´ ` +
2p´ i´ `´ 1
`
.
It follows:
φ(p) ě 1 ðñ ` (k´ p+ 1) + (k´ `) (2p´ i´ `´ 1)´ (k´ `) ` ě 0
ðñ p (2k´ 3`) + `´ (k´ `) (i+ `+ 1) + `2 ě 0
ðñ p (2k´ 3`)´ (k´ `) (i+ `+ 1) + ` (`+ 1) ě 0
ðñ p (2k´ 3`) + (`+ 1) (2`´ k) ě (k´ `) i
If 2k ě 3`, then we plug in the smallest value for p:
φ(p) ě 1 ðù (`+ 2) (2k´ 3`) + (`+ 1) (2`´ k) ě (k´ `) i
ðù (`+ 1) (2k´ 3`) + (`+ 1) (2`´ k) ě (k´ `) i
ðñ (`+ 1) (2k´ 3`+ 2`´ k) ě (k´ `) i
ðñ `+ 1 ě i
The last condition is true by the choice of i, hence φ(p) ě 1.
On the other hand, if 2k ă 3`, then we plug in the greatest value for p:
φ(p) ě 1 ðù (`+ i) (2k´ 3`) + (`+ 1) (2`´ k) ě (k´ `) i
ðñ ` (2k´ 3`) + (`+ 1) (2`´ k) ě (2`´ k) i
ðñ ` (k´ `)
2`´ k + 1 ě i
The last condition is true by the choice of i, hence φ(p) ě 1.
Case `+ i+ 1 ď p ď k: We have
φ(p) =
k´ (p´ 1)
k´ ` +
k´ (p´ i)
k´ ` +
p´ (`+ 1)
`
=
2(k´ p) + i+ 1
k´ ` +
p´ `´ 1
`
.
Using k ă 3`, it follows:
φ(p) ě 1 ðñ 2` (k´ p) + ` (i+ 1) + (k´ `) (p´ `´ 1)´ (k´ `) ` ě 0
ðñ p (k´ 3`) + 2`k+ ` (i+ 1)´ (k´ `) (2`+ 1) ě 0
ðù k (k´ 3`) + 2`k+ ` (i+ 1)´ (k´ `) (2`+ 1) ě 0
ðñ k (k´ `) + ` (i+ 1)´ (k´ `) (2`+ 1) ě 0
ðñ ` (i+ 1) ě (k´ `) (2`´ k+ 1)
ðñ i ě (k´ `) (2`´ k+ 1)
`
´ 1
ðù i ě (k´ `) (2`´ k)
`
The last condition is true by the choice of i, hence φ(p) ě 1.
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Appendix
A Upper Bound by Mean-Value Argument
We prove a rough bound on the price of anarchy for distance payoff (that is, f (x) = x) using
a straightforward generalization of a mean-value argument from the proof of [25, Prop. 2].
We believe that not much better bounds than this can be obtained without extending the
technique.
27 Proposition. The price of anarchy for distance payoff is upper-bounded by 2k.
Proof. Let c be a stable k-coloring for G and fix a player v. Denote
` := max
tP[k]
|{w P N(v) ; c(w) = t}| (28)
the cardinality of the largest color class in v’s neighborhood. Then clearly ` ě ddeg(v)k e. Let t
be a color where the maximum in (28) is attained, so there are ` neighbors of v with color
t. At least one of the two numbers, t+ b k2c or t´ b k2c is in [k]. By choosing an appropriate
one of them, v puts distance b k2c between herself and those ` neighbors, so each of them will
contribute b k2c to v’s payoff. In a stable coloring, such as c, player v chooses such color or
better, hence
W(c) ě ∑
vPV
deg(v)
k b k2c = 2mk b k2c ě 2mk k´12 .
Here, m is the number of edges in G. Using the trivial upper bound WOPT ď 2m (k´ 1), we
obtain:
WOPT
W(c)
ď 2m (k´ 1) ¨ 2k
2m (k´ 1) = 2k
B Counting Neighbors with Same Color
29 Proposition. Define f as counting the neighbors with same color, that is,
f : [0, k] ÝÑ Rě0, x ÞÑ
1 if x = 00 otherwise .
Then the price of anarchy with respect to f is upper-bounded by k, and this bound is tight.
Proof. The upper bound follows from a mean-value argument like in the proof of Propo-
sition 27: for each player v, there is one color with which at least ddeg(v)k e of her neigh-
bors are colored, so choosing this color will yield at least that much payoff for v. Hence
22
W(c) ě ∑vPV deg(v)k = 2mk for each stable coloring c. Using the trivial upper bound WOPT ď 2m
yields the claim.
For the lower bound, consider the complete bipartite graph Kk,k. Clearly, WOPT = 2k2, which
is attained if all players choose the same color, for example color 1. Enumerate vertices in
one partition {v1, . . . , vk} and in the other {w1, . . . ,wk} and define c(vi) := c(wi) := i for each
i P [k]. Then c is stable since whatever color a player chooses, her payoff is always 1. We have
W(c) = 2k, and the price of anarchy is at least 2k
2
2k = k.
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